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INTRODUCTION 
In almost all cases in which the arc of a great empire reaches its apogee and 
turns downward—which is not the same thing as beginning a long inevitable 
slide into decadence, although such definitive decline is always a 
possibility—the diminution of momentum and influence that results rattles 
many and affects absolutely everyone.  In “our” own art world we are 
experiencing such a diminution of growth and influence—and in many 
locales a sharp contraction of opportunity in relation to the supply of 
aspirants—even as we are simultaneously witnessing the unanticipated 
proliferation, expansion, and diversification of other art worlds. 
- Robert Storr1 
 
You can launder money so many different ways.  It’s as unique as snowflakes. 
- Federal Agent Robert Mazur2 
 
Barreling toward the viewer out of a cinematic mountainscape, the titular words 
of Ed Ruscha’s painting Bliss Bucket seem to burst forth from the screen like the 
opening sequence of a film, vibrating with stereoscopic energy.  The phrase “Bliss 
Bucket” is at once comic, nonsensical, and strangely evocative.  Ruscha challenges 
his audience to question both the relationship between text and image and the 
meaning of the phrase itself.  What is a “Bliss Bucket?”  A metaphor for nature as a 
vehicle for joy?  Some source of spiritual nirvana?  A joke?  The artist, for one, has 
left these questions open for the viewer.  Yet perhaps not even Ruscha could have 
anticipated that his words would take on such a literal meaning as they did when 
Bliss Bucket became a vessel for storing illegal funds.  In May 2013, the painting 
and four others were purchased for a collective price of nearly $60 million, paid for 
with money stolen from the Malaysian government.3 
Money laundering has become increasingly prevalent in the art world over the 
last several decades.  The “art world” itself is aptly named.  The network of 
creators, patrons, and agents that facilitate the international sale of artwork is a 
universe unto itself.  While this tight-knit structure supports a thriving artistic 
community, it has also created an opaque industry.  The international art market has 
become a multibillion-dollar business.  As a result of an explosion in market prices 
over the last several decades, art is now seen by many as a legitimate alternative 
investment.  A recent survey of wealth managers shows that seventy eight percent 
(up from fifty five percent in 2014) think art and collectibles should be included as 
part of wealth management offerings.4  However, the industry still operates via the 
 
 1. Robert Storr, Address at CAA Annual Conference, The Art World We’ve Made, the 
Communities We Belong to, the Language We Use, and the Work We Have Yet to Do, (Feb. 16 2013), 
https://perma.cc/H2Q3-BC7G. 
 2. Cindy Perman, This Ex-Undercover Agent Infiltrated Pablo Escobar’s Drug Cartel as a 
Money Launderer, CNBC (July 15, 2016, 11:51 PM), https://perma.cc/9UMV-G34A. 
 3. Complaint at ¶ 349, ¶ 352, U.S. v. One 18-Carat White Gold Diamond Jewelry Set et al., 
2017 WL 2600386 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (trial pleading) (No. CV 17-4445). 
 4. DELOITTE, ART AND FINANCE REPORT 54 (2016), https://perma.cc/A8U8-63Y7. 
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kind of informal handshake agreements that were customary nearly half a century 
ago. 
Art has been described as the “last unregulated market.”5  In a 2016 study, sixty 
two percent of wealth managers identified a lack of regulation in the art market as 
the biggest impediment to incorporating art into their services.6  Money laundering, 
price fixing, and tax evasion have become common in the industry.  In fact, during 
a 2015 panel at the World Economic Forum, the economist Nouriel Roubini 
proclaimed the art industry “shady.”7  Whether and how the art market should be 
regulated has been the subject of frequent debate in recent years.  Although various 
governmental and self-regulatory schemes have been proposed, little progress has 
been made.  The problem of whether and how to regulate the art market has been 
compounded by this insular industry’s global reach and willingness to close ranks. 
While many concerns facing this field can be addressed through self-regulation, 
the same cannot be said for money laundering—the process of funneling illegal 
profits by means of legitimate financial systems.  As regulation of financial 
institutions and other markets such as real estate have tightened, art has become an 
increasingly attractive asset class for criminal actors.8  Given current industry 
practices, even the most careful and diligent art dealers are vulnerable.  Art’s 
transportability, high value, and variable pricing make it an ideal tool for funneling 
or hiding illegal funds.  Its appeal as a vehicle for money laundering is 
compounded by opacity and disorganization within the industry itself.  A 2016 set 
of guidelines on money laundering from the Basel Institute on Governance, an 
independent organization dedicated to encouraging self-regulation by industry 
players including gallerists, auction houses, and institutions (“art market 
operators”), indicated that “[a]rt market operators are at risk of being misused by 
persons seeking to launder the proceeds of criminal activity, thereby creating 
potentially serious reputational, legal and financial consequences for the art trade.”9  
Yet the art world has been resistant—in many ways rightfully so—to the guidelines 
proposed by this and other similar groups. 
This Note argues that the art industry cannot sufficiently deter money laundering 
through self-regulatory measures and that an effective approach to combatting these 
crimes must begin with government oversight.  Part I provides an overview of the 
qualities that make art an attractive market for money launderers and examines 
several common money laundering practices within the industry.  Part II considers 
self-regulatory and governmental strategies that have recently been proposed as 
potential solutions to these problems.  Part III argues that ultimately, focusing on 
 
 5. Marc Spiegler, The Art Trade is the Last Major Unregulated Market, ART NEWSPAPER (June 
2005), https://perma.cc/P526-KELR. 
 6. DELOITTE, supra note 4, at 18. 
 7. John Gapper & Peter Aspden, Davos 2015:  Nouriel Roubini says art market needs 
regulation, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/H2X4-2ME8. 
 8. Hanna Purkey, Note, The Art of Money Laundering, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 111, 113 (2010). 
 9. Basel Institute on Governance, Basel Art Trade Principles on Anti-Money Laundering: Green 
Paper for Public Consultation 2 (June 17, 2016), [hereinafter BAT Principles on Anti-Money 
Laundering], https://perma.cc/QC7Y-E5A4. 
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targeted enforcement and deterrence through existing anti-money laundering laws 
offers the best approach to both preventing wrongdoing in the industry and 
ensuring the future stability of the market.  Using the recent success of the 
Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative as a model, I propose that the United States 
could make a focused effort to root out bad actors within this market and make the 
art industry less attractive to criminals. 
I. MONEY LAUNDERING THROUGH ART WORKS AND CULTURAL 
PROPERTY 
A. OVERVIEW OF MONEY LAUNDERING AND CURRENT REGULATION 
Although the practice was documented as early as 2000 B.C., the term “money 
laundering” first came into use during Prohibition in the United States. 10  
Traditional means of laundering money have included the use of shell corporations, 
off-shore banking, and investments in legitimate business establishments. 11  
International money laundering took on a feverish pace during the drug wars of the 
1980s.  By the end of that decade, global leaders recognized the need to address 
this issue together.  The Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”), an 
intergovernmental body developed under the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development in response to this trend, issued its first 
recommendations for combatting money laundering in December 1989.12  The 
current set of guidelines, comprising forty specific recommendations, was released 
in 2012 (the “2012 Recommendations”).  The first, known as the Risk-Based 
Approach (“RBA”), provides that: 
[c]ountries should identify, assess, and understand the money laundering and 
terrorism financing risks of the country, and take action to mitigate them. . . .  Where 
countries identify higher risks, they should ensure that their [anti-money laundering] 
regime adequately addresses such risks.  Where countries identify lower risks, they 
may decide to allow simplified measures for some of the FATF Recommendations 
under certain conditions.13 
The 2012 Recommendations also stress the need to foster international 
cooperation by means of treaties, mutual legal assistance (including plans for 
freezing and confiscating assets), and extradition agreements.14 
 
 10. Purkey, supra note 8, at 114. 
 11. Id. 
 12. FAUSTO MARTIN DE SANCTIS, MONEY LAUNDERING THROUGH ART:  A CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PERSPECTIVE 11 (2013) (“These recommendations are not binding, but they do exert strong international 
influence on many countries (including nonmembers) to avoid losing credibility, because they are 
recognized by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as international standards for 
combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism.  In the 1996 version, they were adopted by 
130 countries.  In the 2003–2004 version, they were adopted by over 180 countries.”). 
 13. Financial Action Task Force, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and 
the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation 9 (2012), [hereinafter International Standards on Combatting 
Money Laundering], https://perma.cc/46MV-M2CT. 
 14. Id. at 25-28; DE SANCTIS, supra note 12, at 149. 
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In addition to the steps outlined above, the RBA also provides that 
“[c]ountries should require financial institutions and designated non-financial 
businesses and professions . . . to identify, assess and take effective action to 
mitigate their money laundering and terrorist financing risks.”15  In addition to 
defined financial institutions, the FATF established six categories of Designated 
Non-Financial Businesses (“DNFB”) subject to the 2012 Recommendations.  Real 
estate agents and dealers in precious metals and/or stones—professionals whose 
businesses share substantial similarities with those of art dealers—are classified as 
DNFBs.16  Curiously, no art market operators are included among the DNFBs. 
For its part, the United States first adopted both civil and criminal penalties to 
combat money laundering in 1986 with the Money Laundering Control Act, 
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§1956–57.  18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) provides that a 
person is guilty of money laundering when: 
(1) the defendant conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction; 
(2) the transaction involved the proceeds of a statutorily specified unlawful activity; 
(3) the defendant knew the proceeds were from some form of illegal activity; and 
(4) the defendant knew a purpose of the transaction was to conceal or disguise the 
nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds.17 
Criminal violations of § 1956 carry a maximum twenty-year prison sentence and 
a fine of $500,000 or twice the value of the transaction, whichever is greater.  The 
statute also includes a civil penalty provision.  Under § 1956(b), persons who 
engage in violations of subsections 1956(a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3) are liable to the 
United States for $10,000 or the value of the funds involved in the transaction, 
whichever is greater.  Under § 1957, the four intent elements required by § 1956 
 
 15. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATTING MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 13, at 113-
14. 
 16. Id.  (“Designated non-financial businesses and professions means:  a) Casinos.  b) Real estate 
agents.  c) Dealers in precious metals.  d) Dealers in precious stones.  e) Lawyers, notaries, other 
independent legal professionals and accountants – this refers to sole practitioners, partners or employed 
professionals within professional firms.  It is not meant to refer to ‘internal’ professionals that are 
employees of other types of businesses, nor to professionals working for government agencies, who may 
already be subject to AML/CFT measures.  f) Trust and Company Service Providers refers to all persons 
or businesses that are not covered elsewhere under these Recommendations, and which as a business, 
provide any of the following services to third parties:  n acting as a formation agent of legal persons; n 
acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a director or secretary of a company, a partner of a 
partnership, or a similar position in relation to other legal persons; n providing a registered office,; 
business address or accommodation, correspondence or administrative address for a company, a 
partnership or any other legal person or arrangement; n acting as (or arranging for another person to act 
as) a trustee of an express trust or performing the equivalent function for another form of legal 
arrangement; n acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a nominee shareholder for another 
person.”). 
 17. U.S. v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1355 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)). 
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are replaced with a $10,000 threshold amount for each non-aggregated transaction 
and a requirement that a financial institution be involved in the transaction.18 
The International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism 
Act of 2001, passed as Title III of the Patriot Act, amended portions of the Money 
Laundering Control Act and the Banking Securities Act.  The new act provides, in 
relevant part, that nonfinancial businesses are required to report any all-cash 
payments in excess of $10,000. 19   However, unlike financial institutions, 
nonfinancial businesses (including art and antiquities dealers) are under no 
obligation to report suspicious activities to the U.S. government.20 
B. REAL ESTATE AND THE CRIMINAL APPEAL OF NON-FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
As financial industries become more regulated, criminal actors interested in 
laundering funds tend to shift their attention toward non-financial institutions.21  
Real property has often served as a popular means of hiding or transferring large 
amounts of money, especially because it can be difficult to monitor and explain 
variations in property prices because of a lack of reliable and uniform 
information.22  Common money laundering techniques in the real estate industry 
include:  credit-financing schemes, over- and under-valuing property, cash 
payments, and mortgage schemes.23  One popular method of laundering money 
through over-valuation, for example, involves successive sales and purchases.  
Using this system, a launderer would purchase an apartment for $500,000 through a 
shell corporation and subsequently sell the property to another shell corporation for 
$550,000—injecting $50,000 of unclean money.  This process may be repeated 
several times.24 
While real estate investment avoids the strict regulatory schemes that have 
attached to financial institutions in recent years, the industry is still subject to some 
regulation.25  First, real estate titles and deeds require a name, even if the name is 
that of a shell corporation.26  Additionally, real estate agents and mortgage brokers 
have licensing requirements, which compel them to learn and demonstrate 
 
 18. Dept. of Justice, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, https://perma.cc/ES4Q-2Z7R (last visited 
Aug. 17, 2017). 
 19. 31 USCA § 5331. 
 20. 31 USCA § 5318 Note. 
 21. Patricia Cohen, Valuable as Art, but Priceless as a Tool to Launder Money, N.Y. TIMES (May 
12, 2013), https://nyti.ms/2pbtYFb. 
 22. Financial Action Task Force, Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing through the Real 
Estate Sector 5 (2016), https://perma.cc/M2MR-FSN4. 
 23. Id. at 7, 17, 18, 21. 
 24. Id. at 17. 
 25. In 2016, the Treasury Department announced the introduction of a pilot program to monitor 
high end real estate transactions in Manhattan and Miami-Dade County.  The program requires title 
insurance companies to report the true beneficial owner for all-cash transactions made through shell 
corporations.  Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treas., FinCEN Takes Aim at Real Estate Secrecy in 
Manhattan and Miami (Jan. 13, 2016), available at https://perma.cc/TD4J-G5XZ. 
 26. Cohen, supra note 21. 
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sufficient knowledge of legal industry practices with regard to money laundering.  
In the United States, this includes the obligation under the U.S. Patriot Act to report 
any cash payments in excess of $10,000.27  As previously noted, real estate agents 
are also included in the FATF’s list of Designated Non-Financial Businesses.28 
C. THE ART MARKET 
Tom Keatinge, the director of the Centre for Financial Crime and Security 
Studies at the Royal United Services Institute, has observed that “we live in an 
environment where [criminals] look for the cracks in the financial system.  And as 
it currently stands, the art dealer community—and one or two other industries for 
sure—are cracks.”29  Several qualities intrinsic to the art object, such as its 
portability and high, yet often volatile or arbitrary, valuation, contribute to its 
attractiveness as a vehicle for money laundering.  Further, the art market’s lack of 
transparency serves to shield this illegal activity.30 
1.Art’s Unique Appeal as a Vehicle for Laundering Money 
The art and real estate markets share a number of similarities—namely that they 
can be volatile and difficult to monitor.  However, there are aspects of art that make 
it even more attractive to would-be money launderers than real property. 
First, artwork is extremely portable.  It is far easier to transport a painting than a 
penthouse apartment.  Artwork’s scale lends itself to smuggling, allowing criminals 
to circumvent customs and tax agencies.  Its transportable nature allows owners to 
easily move around and hide art assets. 
Second, the art market’s lack of transparency can serve as a tool to mask 
criminal activity.  Unlike professionals in other industries, art market operators are 
under no legal obligation to report suspicious transactions.31  Currently, the banks 
through which these transactions flow—which are subject to reporting 
requirements—serve as the primary mechanism for flagging potential illegal 
activity.32  The industry is also subject to very little actual oversight by law 
enforcement officials.  Art security consultant Robert Spiel has observed that 
“criminals who are comfortable functioning in the art world far outnumber their 
police or law enforcement counterparts.”33  Furthermore, there are no standard 
 
 27. 31 USCA § 5331. 
 28. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 13, at 113-
14. 
 29. Georgina Adams, Guidelines to regulate market are an ‘impossible dream,’ THE ART 
NEWSPAPER, (Mar. 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/E832-LSCD (quoting Tom Keatinge, Islamic State:  
Looting for Terror, (BBC Radio 4 broadcast Feb. 17, 2016)). 
 30. See United States v. Crabtree, No. 92-6330, 1993 WL 359689, at *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 3, 1993) 
(affirming defendant’s money laundering conviction where defendant transferred $50,000 of proceeds 
from the sale of a Renoir painting to an account to hide funds from the bankrupt estate). 
 31. Cohen, supra note 21. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Robert Spiel, Art Theft and Forgery Investigation:  the Complete Field Manual 25 (2000). 
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recordkeeping practices within the industry.  This creates the opportunity for 
individuals to falsify provenance or financial information related to an art object.  
Even where art market operators keep diligent and accurate records, there are 
legitimate reasons—including maintaining client confidentiality and concerns about 
anti-competitive practices—why reputable dealers may not wish to share their 
records with other individuals in the industry, let alone public or governmental 
agencies.34 
Lack of access to prior sales records for an art object can create the opportunity 
for price manipulation.  Appraising the value of an artwork requires highly 
specialized knowledge and, even so, can often be subjective.35  A highly publicized 
dispute between a major gallery and a serious collector serves to illustrate the 
uncertainty and variability in pricing that may occur when even the most 
sophisticated actors are involved.  In 2012, billionaire art collector Ronald 
Perelman brought suit against Gagosian Gallery alleging fraud and breach of 
fiduciary duty related to the sale and exchange of several works of art, including 
Leaving Paphos Ringed with Waves, a painting by Cy Twombly.36  According to 
court filings, Mr. Gagosian first offered Mr. Perelman—a longtime client—the 
Twombly painting for $8 million in April 2011.37  When Mr. Perelman made an 
offer on the work the following week, Mr. Gagosian represented that it had been 
sold to another party.38  In fact Mr. Gagosian had sold the work for $7.25 million to 
an entity controlled by the Mugrabis, a family of serious collectors and sometime 
partners of Mr. Gagosian.39  The painting was paid for, in part, with the Mugrabis’ 
ownership stake in artwork co-owned with Mr. Gagosian.40  Two months later, and 
without disclosing the identity of the new owner, Mr. Gagosian informed Mr. 
Perelman that the Twombly work was back on the market, now at a price of $11.5 
million.41  By the fall of 2011, the parties had agreed to a sale of the work to Mr. 
Perelman’s MAFG Art Fund for $10.5 million—financed through cash and an 
exchange of artwork.42  In less than six months, the Mugrabis made a $2 million 
profit and Mr. Gagosian earned a $1 million commission.43  In his complaint, Mr. 
Perelman alleged that Mr. Gagosian not only overvalued the Twombly painting, but 
also undervalued the prices of the works Mr. Perlman traded into the gallery 
exchange for the piece.44 
 
 34. See infra, subsection II.A.2. 
 35. Purkey, supra note 8, at 114. 
 36. Amended Complaint, MAFG Art Fund, LLC v. Gagosian, 123 A.D.3d 458 (N.Y. 2014) (No. 
6531892012) [hereinafter MAFG Complaint]. 
 37. Id. at ¶ 62. 
 38. Id. at ¶ 63. 
 39. Robert Frank, The Feud That’s Shaking Gallery Walls, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2014, at BU 4, 
https://nyti.ms/2v23B49. 
 40. Id. 
 41. MAFG Complaint, supra note 36, at ¶ 64. 
 42. Id. at ¶ 67. 
 43. Frank, supra note 39. 
 44. MAFG Complaint, supra note 36, at ¶ 62. 
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Ultimately, the court dismissed these charges, finding that Mr. Perleman did not 
conduct independent due diligence and “[a]s to the claim that defendants 
misrepresented the value of certain art works, statements about the value of art 
constitute ‘nonactionable opinion that provide[s] no basis for a fraud claim.’”45  
Even so, the case demonstrates both the speed at which market prices may fluctuate 
and the sometimes-arbitrary nature of art valuation practices. 
Finally, despite the large amounts of money involved in many transactions, art 
world practices remain strikingly informal.  Often, sales occur without a written 
agreement between the parties.  Indeed, it is not uncommon for collectors or dealers 
to trade pieces—conducting like-kind exchanges of artwork in which not a penny 
ever changes hands.46  This informality and the absence of written agreements are 
attractive to actors who do not wish to create a paper trail.  Further, there are no 
licensing requirements for participation in the art market.  In many industries, trade 
organizations act as self-regulatory bodies intended to enforce industry practices 
and fill gaps left by government regulation.  For example, the American Medical 
Association and American Bar Association have established rules for ethics, 
conflicts, disciplinary action, and accreditation in the medical and legal professions 
respectively.  Art industry trade organizations are highly selective and require a 
proven track record of fair and honest dealings prior to consideration for 
membership.  For example, the membership in both the Art Dealers Association of 
America (“ADAA”) and the Association of Professional Art Advisors is by 
invitation-only.47  However, because these organizations self-select only the most 
reputable art market operators for membership, they cannot do much in the way of 
educating or regulating industry-wide ethical practices.  Indeed, membership in a 
trade organization is not a prerequisite for success in the field.  Notably, Gagosian 
Gallery, one of the world’s largest and most profitable galleries, is not a member of 
the ADAA.  Despite the ethical practices maintained by a large portion of art 
market operators, there remains the possibility that some appraisers or dealers may 
be “bought or even made up—insofar as no license or qualification is required of 
them (reputation and experience being sufficient)—and no authorization is even 
required for dealing in art.”48 
 
 45. MAFG Art Fund, LLC v. Gagosian, 123 A.D.3d 458, 459 (N.Y. 2014) (citing Mandarin 
Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, 944 N.E.2d 1104, 1108 (N.Y. 2011)). 
 46. DE SANCTIS, supra note 12, at 53. 
 47. About, ART DEALERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, https://perma.cc/MNT3-48G5 (last visited 
Aug. 17, 2017); About, ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL ART ADVISORS, https://perma.cc/V63N-C5LH 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2017). 
 48. DE SANCTIS, supra note 12, at 58. 
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2.How Money Is Laundered Through Art 
a.Cash Payments 
One of the simplest ways criminals launder money is through all-cash 
payments.49  Compliance with the United States anti-money laundering laws,50 
FATF’s 2012 Recommendations,51 and various international anti-money laundering 
statutes52 requires disclosure of cash payments above a certain amount.  However, 
given the art industry’s global scope, these requirements do not provide a 
comprehensive solution.  First, there are still many countries with no disclosure 
requirements or extremely high thresholds for the requirements, including 
Switzerland, discussed infra.  Individuals interested in laundering money are free to 
make purchases in cash abroad, import the artwork into the United States, and sell 
it through legitimate channels.  Further, many art institutions operate in multiple 
countries, including jurisdictions where these requirements do not apply or may not 
be enforced.  Both Christie’s and Sotheby’s allow payment to be remitted in cash.53  
This is especially notable considering these auction houses’ increasing involvement 
in facilitating private sales.54 
b.Under- and Over-Valuation 
As previously discussed, the opaque nature of the art market creates an 
opportunity for price manipulation.  As in real estate, an individual interested in 
laundering money may create a series of successive sales and purchases.  Lack of 
education in art and art valuation amongst customs agents allows importers to 
circumvent customs.  In one galling example, the Brazilian banker Edemar Cid 
Ferreira attempted to import a painting into the United States with a declared value 
of $100.  In fact, the shipment contained Hannibal, a painting which the artist Jean-
Michel Basquiat estimated to be worth $8 million.55 
 
 49. International Standards on Combating Money Laundering, supra note 13, at 99. 
 50. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957. 
 51. International Standards on Combating Money Laundering, supra note 13, at 97. 
 52. See, e.g., E.U. regulations (10,000 EUR), Switzerland (100,000 Swiss Francs), Luxembourg, 
U.K. 
 53. According to Sotheby’s website, “You can pay by bank transfer, cheque or cash (subject to 
certain restrictions and legal limits).  Certain credit cards are accepted at particular Sotheby’s locations 
but please contact these sale locations directly for specific information.  Payment must be sent from the 
invoiced party and not from a third party.”  Buy & Sell, SOTHEBY’S, https://perma.cc/HS7M-26GC (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2017) (emphasis added).  This policy seems consistent with U.S. and international anti-
money laundering statutes.  Christie’s stated policy is vaguer:  “We accept wire transfers, bank drafts or 
cashier’s orders, cash or checks.  Under certain circumstances, some Christie’s salerooms may accept 
payment by credit card (check with your local Post-Sale Services team for details).”  Post-Sale Services, 
CHRISTIE’S, https://perma.cc/QF6N-R9EQ (last visited Jan. 20, 2017). 
 54. Anna Brady, What do auction house private sales mean for collectors and the art market?, 
APOLLO MAGAZINE (Aug. 4, 2016 ), https://perma.cc/37GT-TPGT; Marion Maneker, How Private Sales 
Conquered Auction Houses, ART MARKET MONITOR (Nov. 10, 2014), https://perma.cc/QK38-6A4N. 
 55. Cohen, supra note 21.  Ferreira was convicted of money laundering and other financial crimes 
in Brazil in 2006 and sentenced to twenty-one years in prison.  The U.S. Government filed a forfeiture 
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c.Record Falsification 
Money launderers can also conceal art assets from authorities by falsifying sales 
and loan records.  In Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Devine, defendant 
Susan Devine and her husband established a criminal enterprise in order to hide the 
proceeds of a penny stock market manipulation scheme.56   One method for 
concealing funds included concealing valuable art and furniture.  The defendant 
created an inventory of art and furniture located in her Mallorca, Spain home with 
an estimated value exceeding £2.2 million, which she sent to a coconspirator.57  
The coconspirator sent back a fraudulent loan agreement, backdated by two years, 
and signed on behalf of a shell corporation, New York Art Trading.  Through the 
agreement, New York Art Trading purported to lend Devine art and furniture with 
an estimated value of €2 million.  Devine signed the backdated agreement, which 
gave the false appearance that the valuable property was lent to, rather than owned 
by, the defendant.58  This property was sent to Switzerland for safekeeping before 
being returned to Spain the following year.59 
d.Black Market Transactions 
It is also the case that a large amount of the artwork used to launder money is 
stolen work.  Stolen artwork can be sold through black market channels and 
eventually make its way into the legitimate art market.  A criminal actor may 
purchase a stolen artwork with illegally obtained funds through an all-cash 
transaction and then, by misrepresenting the work as legally obtained, sell it 
through an art market operator.  While databases like the Art Loss Register and 
Interpol’s stolen art register have made strides toward documenting lost, stolen, and 
missing artwork, art theft and the sale of stolen artwork remain major problems.60 
Several national statutes and international treaties attempt to address these 
issues.  In 1970, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (“UNESCO”) drafted a Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property.  The Convention requires special export licenses and an administrative 
control system to enable State Parties to prevent illegal importation and 
exploitation of artworks.61  As of 2017, 134 states are party to the Convention.62  In 
 
notice for the work under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c).  In 2014, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
use of materially false invoices was sufficient to establish that artwork was “smuggled or clandestinely 
imported or introduced” into United States and affirmed the judgment of civil forfeiture.  See United 
States v. Broadening-Info Enterprises, Inc., 578 F. App’x 10 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 56. No. 2:15–cv–328–FtM–29DNF, 2015 WL 12838168 at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 1, 2015). 
 57. Id. at *9. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See About Us, ART LOSS REGISTER, https://perma.cc/8HAT-R7TT (last visited Jan. 20, 2017); 
Works of Art:  Database, INTERPOL, https://perma.cc/799V-XMZP (last visited Jan. 21, 2017). 
 61. DE SANCTIS, supra note 12, at 16. 
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the United States, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs oversees claims 
in violation of the UNESCO Convention.63  At the request of UNESCO, in 1995 
the UNIDROIT International Institute for the Unification of Private Law drafted a 
Convention on Stolen or Illegally exported Cultural Objects in order to establish a 
uniform minimum body of private law rules for the international art trade to 
complement the 1970 UNESCO Convention.64  Additionally, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
13, the U.S. Cultural Property Implementation Act of March 1983, provides a 
series of administrative measures intended to protect cultural property imported 
into the United States.  Section 2609(a) of the Act establishes that “[a]ny 
designated archaeological or ethnological material or article of cultural property 
which is imported into the United States in violation of Section 2606 of this title or 
Section 2607 of this title shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture.”65  18 U.S.C. § 
542 also makes it a crime to import goods into the country “by means of any 
fraudulent or false invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any 
false statement, written or verbal,” and specifically addresses smuggling.66  There 
have also been efforts by arts trade organizations over the years to combat 
trafficking in stolen works, efforts which have ramped up given that, “[i]t can be 
assumed that the problem of illegal trafficking in art objects and measures taken to 
combat it are destined to become more significant over the next years.”67  Properly 
conducted and maintained provenances for each art work also serve as a key tool in 
preventing the trafficking and sale of stolen works by ensuring a work has a 
continuous chain of legal owners.  Yet the fact that art crime is on the rise despite 
these laws and practices underscores the fact that these protections, as currently 
enforced, are inadequate. 
 
 62. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, UNESCO (last updated Aug. 25, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/CKV8-AB3P. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Convention on Stolen or Illegally exported Cultural Objects, UNIDROIT (1995), 
https://perma.cc/KW5Q-QEPK.  It should be noted that, based on feedback provided to the authors of 
the BAT Guidelines, the UNIDROIT “Convention on the whole, appears to be inacceptable to art 
market participants.”  Dr. Thomas Christ and Claudia von Selle, Basel Art Trade Guidelines:  
Intermediary Report of a Self-Regulation Initiative 23 (2012), [hereinafter BAT Guidelines], 
https://perma.cc/4VLA-USUM. 
 65. 19 U.S.C. § 2609. 
 66. 18 U.S.C. §§ 542, 545. 
 67. BAT Guidelines, supra note 64, at 23. 
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II. PROPOSED SELF-REGULATORY MEASURES AND RECENT 
TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
A. THE BASEL ART TRADE GUIDELINES AND BASEL ART TRADE PRINCIPLES 
ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 
1.An Impossible Dream:  Development of the Guidelines 
Acknowledging the unique challenges facing their industry, certain market 
actors have attempted to address the problem of money laundering through art.  
The Basel Institute on Governance is an independent non-profit organization 
located in the Swiss city that has become the home of the industry’s most spirited 
and profitable annual circus:  the Basel Art Fair.  In 2010, it convened meetings of 
art professionals, including lawyers, art dealers, and representatives of auction 
houses, to discuss potential self-regulatory solutions.68  These meetings resulted in 
a working proposal introduced as the Basel Art Trade Guidelines (“BAT 
Guidelines”) in 2012.69  The BAT Guidelines tend to track both the FATF’s 2012 
Recommendations and anti-laundering guidelines promulgated by financial 
groups. 70   In particular, they advocate rigorous due diligence for all art 
transactions.71  The BAT Guidelines are intended to apply to both art market 
operators and art market objects themselves (i.e. cultural property and collectable 
objects).72  According to the authors of the BAT Guidelines, “it is in the interests of 
all art market participants to adopt and implement these guidelines.  Precisely 
because an art market operator may adopt interchangeable roles, proper due 
diligence conducted as a seller will likely benefit that same operator when acting as 
a buyer.”73 
Although major art world players participated in the initial meetings, dialogue 
and negotiations over the BAT Guidelines eventually broke down.74  Large auction 
houses argued that they already had rigorous anti-laundering policies in place, and 
other organizations remained concerned about the financial implications of such 
strict rules.75  Attorney Lawrence Kaye, who participated in initial discussions, 
characterized the BAT Guidelines as an “impossible dream.”76  Indeed, when the 
Guidelines were eventually completed and released, the authors themselves noted 
in their conclusion that: 
 
 68. Id. at 1. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking, WOLFSBERG (2000, rev. 2012), 
[hereinafter Wolfsberg AML Principles], https://perma.cc/KHM9-N9DM.  
 71. Adams, supra note 29; Wolfsberg AML Principles, supra note 70. 
 72. BAT Guidelines, supra note 64, at 8-10. 
 73. Id. at 9-10. 
 74. Adams, supra note 29.  Participants included representatives from Christie’s, Sotheby’s, and 
Phillips, as well as The Fine European Art Fair (“TEFAF”), art dealers, and attorneys.  Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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Unfortunately, the art trade has shown a pronounced lack of interest in constructively 
dealing with the proposed draft BAT Guidelines and the issues it addresses.  
Reactions to a letter sent out to key representatives of the art trade industry by the 
Basel Institute on Governance in July 2011 were met with reservation and outright 
refusal to engage.  Both the arbitrating role of the Institute and the Guidelines as such 
have remained unacceptable or unimportant to art market participants.77 
2.The Impracticality of Effective Self-Regulation 
Following the passage of more stringent anti-money laundering regulations in 
Switzerland in 2015, see infra, the Basel Institute on Governance published a green 
paper, the Basel Art Trade Principles on Anti-Money Laundering (“BAT Principles 
on Anti-Money Laundering”), in 2016.78  The paper “suggests that art market 
operators should implement a reasonably designed risk based approach by which 
they identify the criteria to measure potential money laundering risks.”79  With 
regard to money laundering, the three primary considerations the BAT Guidelines 
and the BAT Principles on Anti-Money Laundering identify are that an art market 
operator should know:  his customer, the provenance of the art object, and the 
provenance of the funds used to purchase the object.80  However, this approach 
places too much of the onus on arts professionals.  While it is true that art market 
operators are in the best position to ensure the provenance of works of art, many are 
not properly equipped to fully address the other two factors. 
Art market operators are in the best position to develop and maintain thorough, 
accurate provenances for the works of art and other cultural property that pass 
through their hands.  Establishing complete provenances for works in their 
possession is a best practice that most reputable art dealers already perform in their 
ordinary course of business.  The BAT Guidelines provide further guidance for best 
practices for research, including: 
requesting identification information from the seller, establishing credibility and 
plausibility references relating to the seller, referring to publicly available databases 
and listings relating to the parties to the transaction and the art object respectively; 
obtaining any relevant and available legal documents, witness declarations, [or] expert 
opinions as the case may be, and checking the restoration history as appropriate and 
presenting circumstantial evidence when no direct documentation is available.81 
The BAT Guidelines also provide for enhanced due diligence if there are 
questions as to the work’s provenance or if the seller requests that his identity 
remain confidential.  Enhanced due diligence includes seeking a second opinion, 
consulting further databases, and conducting background checks on the seller—
including his previous art dealings.82  Finally, the BAT Guidelines propose that all 
 
 77. BAT GUIDELINES, supra note 64, at 23. 
 78. BAT Principles on Anti-Money Laundering, supra note 9. 
 79. Id. at 3. 
 80. BAT GUIDELINES, supra note 64, at 11. 
 81. Id. at 13. 
 82. Id. 
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expenses incurred in the process of this enhanced research process are to be borne 
by the seller.83 
Though the guidelines for research and evidence gathering are sound, some 
industry professionals have pushed back against the enhanced due diligence 
requirements laid out in the BAT Guidelines.  In defending the BAT Guidelines, its 
authors have pointed to these commenters’ lack of knowledge about what the law 
actually requires,84 but there are still legitimate concerns about what has been 
called the “‘excessive and unrealistic’ scope of the BAT Guidelines, especially with 
respect to the requirement of a second expert opinion.”85  Requiring a seller to 
cover the cost of researching and establishing provenance is not standard industry 
practice, and many law-abiding sellers may balk at the idea of incurring such costs.  
Dealers will either pay these costs and pass them on to the buyer or absorb the costs 
themselves.  As a result, only one party in this procedure has any incentive to 
mandate compliance.  This dynamic highlights one area in which art market 
operators are unlikely or unwilling to change their practices because of the possible 
financial—and personal—implications of compliance.  Because the art market is 
such a small world involving repeat players, where interpersonal relationships are 
essential, art industry operators may determine that conducting rigorous 
investigations will create the impression that one is suspicious of a seller’s 
trustworthiness.  Accordingly, dealers may not act in the most prudent manner for 
the sake of maintaining good relations. 
Know Your Customer (“KYC”) is an approach that tracks the customer due 
diligence requirements the United States’ Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(“FinCEN”) proposed in 2014.86  The four central requirements of KYC are:  (a) 
identifying and verifying the identity of customers, (b) identifying and verifying the 
identity of “beneficial owners”—the person or persons who enjoy property benefits 
in equity—when a work is bought or sold by a legal entity, (c) understanding the 
nature and purpose of customer relationships, and (d) conducting ongoing 
monitoring to maintain and update customer information and identify suspicious 
transactions.” 87   The BAT Principles on Anti-Money Laundering guidelines 
address KYC requirements as a stand-alone category, requiring an art market 
operator to identify both the buyer and seller by “name, date of birth, address, and 
such further information that may be appropriate or required by law or 
regulation.”88  Though the desire for confidentiality may seems suspicious, there 
are many legitimate reasons—including, amongst others, the desire not to attract 
 
 83. Id. at 14. 
 84. “Those without a legal background found it somewhat difficult to assess the various 
provisions regarding unclear or doubtful provenance and residual doubt.  However, elucidation on this 
(and other) finer points of the BAT Guidelines will be a projected part of the implementation 
procedure.”  Id. at 22. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. 45151 
(proposed Aug. 4, 2014). 
 87. Dan Ryan, FinCEN:  Know Your Customer Requirements, HARV. LAW SCH. FORUM ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION (Feb. 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/GJ8L-988D. 
 88. BAT PRINCIPLES ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 9, at 5. 
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undue public attention or to avoid industry gossip—for which clients may wish to 
keep their identities private.89 
Under the BAT Principles on Anti-Money Laundering, enhanced due diligence 
with regard to client identification is required for: 
•Persons residing in and/or having funds sourced from countries identified by 
credible sources as having inadequate AML standards or representing high 
risk for crime and corruption. 
•Persons engaged in types of economic or business activities or sectors known to 
be susceptible to money laundering. 
•Certain categories of “Politically Exposed Persons” (which may/may not 
include so called domestic PEPs), referring to individuals holding or, as 
appropriate, having held, senior, prominent, or important public positions 
with substantial authority over policy, operations or the use or allocation of 
government-owned resources, such as senior government officials, senior 
executives of government corporations, senior politicians, important 
political party officials, etc., as well as their close family and close 
associates. 
•Persons who are not physically present.90 
While these requirements are rational and would likely lead to greater 
compliance and transparency, they are not a workable solution for all transactions 
in the stubbornly opaque art world.  While art world operators acting as 
intermediaries between two parties—a seller (either an artist on the primary market 
or a consignee on the secondary market) and a buyer—should be able to and, 
indeed, have a responsibility to conduct reasonable KYC due diligence, the 
situation becomes more complicated when multiple art market operators are 
transacting with each other on behalf of their clients.  Frequently, art market 
operators will make a sale through an intermediary (often an art advisor or a 
gallery) acting on behalf of a client who wishes to remain anonymous. 
Art market operators lack the incentives to conduct the rigorous background 
investigation the BAT Guidelines propose, especially in the context of the art fair 
circuit, which has emerged as the dominant primary market for sales, where art 
deals are often made in a matter of minutes.91  Accordingly, art market operators 
are highly resistant to the requirement of advanced due diligence in this area.  
Furthermore, as discussed above, confidentiality and reputation serve as valuable 
currency within the art world.  Requiring extensive disclosures would chill the 
informal and often decades-long relationships between art dealers, advisors, and 
collectors that underpin the industry.  In fact, the Anglo-American representatives 
reviewing the BAT Guidelines specifically rejected article 3.2, addressing 
“balancing interests” between disclosure and confidentiality, “on the grounds that it 
 
 89. See Hoffman v. L&M Arts, et al., 838 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 90. BAT PRINCIPLES ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 9, at 6. 
 91. Y-Jean Mun-Delsalle, The Art Fair Boom Is Forever Changing the Way the Art Market Does 
Business, FORBES (Apr. 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/EMH5-3R5S. 
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fails to adequately take into account the specific conditions and circumstances of 
the art market, which they believe to be unable to function at all without the current 
levels of commercial confidentiality.”92 
Additionally, some art market operators lack both the resources and incentives 
to certify the provenance of monies used to purchase art.  Galleries, although they 
deal in multimillion-dollar works of art within an international market, are small 
businesses.93  The BAT Principles on Anti-Money Laundering suggested that 
“[s]mall businesses may not have the resources to address money-laundering risks 
in the same way that large auction houses or major dealers and galleries will have, 
and may have a different risk exposure.”94  Yet this is not exactly accurate.  While 
it is certainly true that these businesses do not have the same financial capabilities, 
it is hardly the case that they are not subject to the same level of risk.  Indeed, 
because small businesses often lack the financial and human capital that larger arts 
organizations can devote to identifying suspicious activity, they may be even more 
susceptible to being taken advantage of by criminal actors by virtue of their size.  
But requiring small and mid-sized galleries to invest substantial resources in the 
rigorous due diligence protocol laid out in the BAT Guidelines and the BAT 
Principles on Anti-Money Laundering would put these organizations at a 
competitive disadvantage compared to auction houses and international mega-
galleries. 
The desire for confidentiality and anonymity that pervades the industry can also 
create challenges for art market operators when tracing the provenance of funds.  
The BAT Principles on Anti-Money Laundering propose several highly beneficial 
policies that art market operators can and should follow, including only accepting 
payment from reputable financial institutions located in countries that have 
implemented anti-money laundering measures, and not accepting cash payments.95  
However, some other proposed payment policies prove problematic, especially 
those related to third parties.  This is particularly true given the increasing role art 
advisors play in facilitating sales. 96   The BAT Principles on Anti-Money 
Laundering propose that art market operators should “adopt a policy of not 
accepting payments from third parties,” and “[i]f the buyer is a domiciliary 
company, or acting as an intermediary or otherwise on behalf of a third party, the 
art market operator must establish the ultimate beneficial owner of the funds (the 
natural person).”97  This type of approach would certainly deter criminal actors 
from relying on third parties to provide a cloak of anonymity when buying or 
selling art.  However, it also illustrates the problems and impracticalities of 
 
 92. BAT GUIDELINES, supra note 64, at 21. 
 93. Katya Kazakina, Desperate Art Galleries Give Up as Chelsea Rents Double, Bloomberg (Feb. 
20, 2013), https://perma.cc/35KG-JQPE; Running a Gallery:  An HBR Small Business Interview, 
HARVARD BUS. REV. (Jan. 13, 2013), https://perma.cc/C845-Y726. 
 94. BAT PRINCIPLES ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING , supra note 9, at 2 n.2. 
 95. Id. at 8. 
 96. Henri Neuendorf, Art Demystified:  What Is The Role of Art Advisors?, Artnet (Aug. 11, 
2016), https://perma.cc/G4Q7-V2XS. 
 97. See supra note 94. 
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importing anti-money laundering procedures from other industries into the 
idiosyncratic art market. 
Requiring a financial institution to confirm the beneficial owners of transactions 
conducted through a third party proves reasonable in the realm of bank transfers.98  
As long as a beneficial owner is not conducting illegal activity, he is in no way 
harmed by the process.  Under these circumstances, the process amounts to fact 
checking.  However, this approach creates problems in the context of the art market 
where there are practical and perfectly legal reasons why an art collector may be 
reluctant to disclose to an art market operator information that he would otherwise 
freely share with a bank for identification purposes.  As previously stated, the high-
end art market is a core group of repeat players.  Facts and gossip can travel 
quickly through any small network.  A participant may wish to keep his sales or 
purchases private for any number of personal, social, or financial reasons.  For 
example, a participant may want to avoid unwanted solicitations in the future.  
Sending unsolicited materials to collectors, in the form of exhibition catalogues, 
emails, formal offers, and press kits, is one of art dealers’ primary sales tactics.99  
To be certain, many collectors appreciate these packages.  However, others who 
prefer not to receive unsolicited materials might employ art advisors as a tactic to 
avoid unwanted and invasive communications from art market operators. 
B. RECENT TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
1.Switzerland 
Spurred in part by an ongoing court battle between Russian oligarch Dimitry 
Rybolovlev and Swiss art dealer Yves Bouvier involving a painting by 
Modigliani,100 last year Switzerland adopted an amendment to its Customs Act 
intended to restrict “freeports.”  These warehouses for goods in transit serve as tax 
havens for the wealthy, and have become the loci of numerous questionable art 
transactions.101  Forty percent of the products stored in Swiss ports are cultural 
property.102  According to art law expert Andrea Raschèr, in Swiss freeports, sales 
“of cultural items are negotiated without ever leaving [the freeports].”103  If the 
buyer and seller both have storage space within the facility, an item may be 
exchanged for cash and transported to a new location within the freeport without 
any customs or sales records.  There are even exhibition rooms within the freeports, 
 
 98. Lest we forget, these principles are modeled after the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering 
Principles regulating banks. 
 99. This is primarily true for art dealers and galleries. Joel Mesler, The Art of Art Dealing, N.Y. 
OBSERVER (Dec. 2, 2013), https://perma.cc/69VJ-DJLV. 
 100. Robert Frank, A Multimillion-Dollar Markup on a Modigliani, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2015), 
https://nyti.ms/2yKnrDn; Sam Knight, The Bouvier Affair, NEW YORKER (Feb. 8, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/K8RU-JDSN. 
 101. Isabelle Eichenberger, Art:  the new frontier in the fight against money laundering, SWISS 
INFO (June 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/C23L-XFUS. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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“parallel arrangements which bear no relation to the purpose of these structures that 
were created with the intent of transiting merchandise, not storing it for 
decades.”104  There have traditionally been no reporting requirements for cash 
transactions under Swiss law, so many sales are conducted in cash “because a lot of 
people take their money out and keep it” in the freeports.105 
While the new Swiss amendment does not expressly mention art dealers, it 
requires all traders—a category that includes art dealers—to follow certain 
procedures, including:  (1) the verification of the identity of the buyer; (2) the 
identification of the beneficial owner and the judicial structure of the buyer; and (3) 
the establishment and retention of documents relating to the transaction; in the case 
of cash payments in excess of 100,000 Swiss francs, additional due diligence may 
be required.106  Although the amendment came into effect on January 1, 2016, the 
government is still in the process of creating a strategy for its application and 
enforcement. 
It is unclear what impact these new regulations will have on actual market 
practices.  Even if the Swiss government is able to devise a comprehensive 
approach to enforcement, the 100,000 Swiss franc minimum requirement for 
disclosure is still high enough to leave ample room for questionable transactions to 
occur. 
2.United Kingdom 
In March 2017, the British government announced plans to create a new Office 
for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision (“OPBAS”) within its 
Financial Conduct Authority. 107   These proposed reforms were prompted by 
concerns that inconsistencies in guidance and compliance across industries created 
loopholes for criminals and that, “whilst some supervisors are highly effective in 
some areas, there is room for improvement across the board, including in 
understanding and applying a risk-based approach to supervision and in providing a 
credible deterrent.”  Following a call for further information, the British 
government released a set of draft regulations, “Oversight of Professional Body 
Anti-Money Laundering Supervision Regulations 2017,” on July 27, 2017.  Under 
the draft regulations, if enacted, OPBAS would act as a sort of uber-watchdog 
working with and supervising industry specific regulatory bodies in the hope of 
making the U.K. a “hostile environment for illicit finance.”108 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Sandrine Ciroud & Deborah Lechtman, Art, money laundering and terrorist financing:  new 
developments in Swiss law - Art, Cultural Institutions and Heritage Law, INT’L BAR ASS’N (Sept. 29, 
2015), https://perma.cc/9ULN-6RQB (“Art dealers who… accept cash transactions above 100,000 Swiss 
francs will also have to mandate an auditor who will report to the authority in charge of supervising 
dealers, and will need to report to [the Money Laundering Reporting Office of Switzerland] if the dealer 
under supervision does not comply with his or her communication duties.”). 
 107. Press Release, Financial Conduct Authority, FCA seeks views regarding the Office for 
Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision (July 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/T7D3-BZ4X. 
 108. Id. 
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While there is no specific regulatory body for art market operators, any business 
operating in the U.K. that accepts more than €10,000 in cash for a single purchase 
must register as a High Value Dealer, meaning that it will fall under the supervision 
of the Financial Conduct Authority.  In addition to reporting transactions over 
€10,000, High Value Dealers are subject to a number of requirements tracking the 
FAFT’s 2012 Recommendations’ Risk-Based Approach, including:  (1) 
establishing policies and procedures for identifying risky transactions; (2) ensuring 
that the business has enough trained staff to implement those policies; (3) 
conducting customer due diligence (including enhanced customer due diligence for 
politically exposed persons and their associates); (4) reporting any suspicious 
activity; and (5) maintaining accurate, up-to-date records.  Failure to comply with 
these regulations may result in unlimited criminal financial penalties and up to two 
years in prison.109  However, compliance with these requirements for High Value 
Dealers in the art market has not been as closely monitored as in financial 
industries. 110   If established, OPBAS will provide strict oversight to ensure 
compliance with these existing regulations. 
Art market operators may be wary of the burdens associated with strict 
compliance.  Rebecca Davies, chief executive of the Association of Art & Antiques 
Dealers stated, “Although we support the concept of a simplification of the anti-
money laundering (AML) rules, they must be fit for purpose.  The art market is 
already subject to great swathes of regulation and added bureaucracy simply results 
in poorer regulation, increased costs and reduced competition.”111  However, it is 
important to note that, unlike under the proposed BAT Guidelines, the UK’s system 
provides an opt-out mechanism:  art market operators are only required to register 
as High Value Dealers if they accept cash payments in excess of €10,000.  Small 
businesses and other organizations who might find compliance overly burdensome 
may avoid these requirements by making it a policy to never accept cash payments 
above that amount—a policy that itself discourages money laundering.  Ultimately, 
if actually enforced under OPBAS, the UK’s proposed scheme for the regulation of 
high value art transactions offers a promising blueprint. 
III. ALTERNATIVES:  DATABASES, GOVERNMENT REGULATION, 
AND THE KLEPTOCRACY TASKFORCE 
The chilly reception that the BAT Guidelines and anti-money laundering 
recommendations have received from industry actors suggests self-regulation will 
likely never offer a workable solution to money laundering in the art market.  
Traditional anti-laundering efforts hinge on disclosure.  However, the specific 
economic disadvantages associated with transparency in the art marketplace are 
simply too large for art professionals to willingly establish anti-money laundering 
 
 109. HM Revenue & Customs, Anti Money Laundering Supervision:  Guidance for High Value 
Dealers, 2010 (UK). 
 110. David Elsworth, Cost fears rise for High Value Dealers after money laundering legislation 
announcement, TLCompliance (Mar. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/P929-267D. 
 111. Id. 
SHEA, TARGETING MONEY LAUNDERERS IN THE ART MARKET, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 665 (2018) 
2018] TARGETING MONEY LAUNDERERS IN THE ART MARKET 685 
regulation.  Accordingly, government intervention seems to offer the only possible 
avenue to a solution. 
Industry commenters understandably balked when the BAT Guidelines proposed 
establishing a register of art sales that could be accessed by both members and law 
enforcement.112  Others have proposed the United States create a federally-funded 
database wherein, when a sale is made, an art market operator must register the 
details—including the work’s details, the sale price, and the identities of the buyer 
and seller—with a confidential system.  It is true that establishing such a database 
would be a major step toward providing law enforcement with data about art sales 
that would be useful in combating not only money laundering but other art related 
crimes like tax evasion.113  While this approach seems simpler and more attractive 
than self-regulation, it too fails.  First, with the exception of new artwork created 
after the system has been established, the value of existing artwork would be self-
reported upon entry (indeed, if reported at all), meaning there would be no way to 
confirm the accuracy of a reported value.  Indeed, a self-reporting requirement may 
even facilitate the kinds of over- and under-valuation schemes that the subjective 
price of artwork already make possible.  Additionally, reporting requirements 
would create an incredible administrative burden for arts organizations and 
galleries, which are often already understaffed.114  There are also very real concerns 
related to cybersecurity and hacking.115 
Reporting and disclosure requirements do seem to offer a better solution.  Yet 
any governmental attempts to establish new and inclusive anti-money laundering 
regulations will face challenges similar to those encountered by would-be self-
regulators.  Specifically, the regulations that might work for large scale art market 
operators like auction houses and mega-galleries would cripple small, independent 
dealers.  Accordingly, a structure similar to the U.K. High Value Dealers system—
whereby businesses who would be overburdened by compliance may de facto opt 
out by not engaging in cash transactions over $10,000—may offer a feasible 
solution, if it was properly enforced. 
However, the most effective way to deter criminal actors from using the U.S. art 
market—and, by extension, the international market—as a shelter for illegal funds 
is rigorous enforcement of existing money laundering laws within the industry.  
Taking an aggressive approach to rooting out criminal actors could be the most 
effective way to deter use of the art market as a vehicle for laundering illegal 
money.  The Department of Justice’s Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative 
provides a possible model for an anti-money laundering task force dedicated to the 
art market.  This initiative was established in 2010 as part of an expanded effort to 
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combat the flow of illegal funds into the United States.116  It particularly targets 
“kleptocrats”:  international government officials that embezzle public funds.  The 
Initiative has been an incredible success, freezing $3 billion in assets taken illegally 
from countries like Nigeria, Malaysia, and Equatorial Guinea.  Notably, work by 
many artists, including Van Gogh and Monet, were amongst the assets recovered as 
a part of these efforts, underscoring the need for additional oversight in this area. 
A similar effort focused on monitoring artworks that may be desirable to 
criminals, rather than the bad actors themselves, could prove a novel and effective 
strategy.  Currently, money laundering through art is usually only discovered 
incidentally and “tends to be handled case by case.”117  But a directed effort toward 
tracking illegal activity through art purchases could actually be an effective strategy 
for identifying money launderers rather than vice versa.  It should be noted that 
some of the very characteristics that make it difficult to regulate money laundering 
in the art market—namely, its small scale and idiosyncratic products—could 
actually make the industry a fertile ground for identifying the flow of illegal funds 
through the United States.  Notably, many individuals laundering money through 
art have similar tastes.  Works by the same small group of artists (Monet, Van 
Gogh, Picasso, Basquiat) turn up again and again in asset forfeiture cases.118  Since 
these artists are deceased, their entire bodies of work are complete and thus can be 
monitored by a government task force with relative ease.119  Such an approach 
could not only prove useful for identifying new criminal activity, but would also 
put would-be bad actors on notice that the art market is no longer a viable refuge 
for money laundering and encourage dealers to conduct thorough due diligence 
when dealing with these objects. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
Criminal behavior thrives in the shadows and, over the last several decades, the 
art market has provided an increasingly attractive place for these activities to hide.  
Art’s portability, high value, and subjective pricing make it an ideal medium in 
which to hide illegal funds.  In addition, the art world’s opacity and secrecy help in 
shielding money launderers from the eyes of law enforcement agencies.  Art 
professionals can take steps to limit this behavior by conducting rigorous 
provenance searches and due diligence, but the premium the industry places on 
reputation and confidentiality may prevent them from digging too deep.  While 
proposals for self-regulatory programs such as the BAT Guidelines are admirable, 
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art market operators have no incentive to adopt a system that requires more 
transparency.  Legislation such as Switzerland’s new customs requirements are a 
step in the right direction but do not go far enough.  The U.K.’s recent efforts to 
more strictly enforce existing regulations, if passed, could prove an attractive 
model for monitoring art sales in this country.  Ultimately, though, the existing 
body of U.S. anti-money laundering laws, if properly and rigorously enforced, 
could deter money laundering in the art world by making it clear to criminal actors 
that the market is no longer a safe haven for this type of activity. 
